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ABSTRACT 
 
                While the literature on licensing through the Transaction Costs lens is rather extensive, 
the role played by third parties in the licensor-licensee relationship has received very limited 
attention. However, although licensing agreements are essentially dyadic exchanges, licensors 
and licensees frequently decide to resort to services developed by third parties in order to ease 
and support their licensing relationships. This support can be required at one or more contractual 
level(s): the identification of a licensing partner, the negotiation of the licensing contract, the 
monitoring of the licensing relationship, and the enforcement of the licensing contractual terms. 
In this paper, I propose, first, a typology of support services developed by third parties. Second, 
in line with the Transaction Costs arguments, I develop propositions regarding the incentives for 
licensing partners to resort to support services develop by third parties. I argue that this resort is 
contingent to the levels of asset specificity and uncertainty characterizing the licensing 
transaction.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
When studying technology licensing agreements through the Transaction Costs (TC) approach, 
most of the business economics and management literature has been focused on the trade-off 
between the licensing mode of governance and alternative modes of governance structure (e.g.; 
Buckley and Casson, 1976,1998; Dunning, 1981; Rugman, 1981; Hennart, 1982, 1988). The 
main tenet of this broad literature is that firms will opt for a governance structure along the 
market-hierarchy continuum, which minimizes the costs of transacting, in turn determined by the 
attributes of transaction and the institutional environment. Licensing agreements are considered 
as a hybrid form of coordination between markets and hierarchy (Williamson, 1985; Coase, 1988; 
Aoki, 1988; Hennart, 1993) since they simultaneously involve mechanisms proper to the markets 
and mechanisms proper to the hierarchy2. 
    More recently, scholars have begun to explore the trade-off between distinct forms of licensing 
agreement (e.g.; distinct financial conditions, distinct combinations of transferred resources, 
distinct dispute resolution mechanisms, distinct regimes of exclusivity) in a TC tradition (e.g.; 
Bessy and Brousseau, 1999; Anand and Khanna, 2000; Arora and Fosfuri, 2002; Brousseau and 
Coeurderoy, 2005; Hagedoorn and Hesen, 2007; Brousseau, Coeurderoy, and Chasserant, 2007). 
These scholars show that licensing agreements do not form a homogeneous set of contractual 
arrangements. Instead, they investigate the raison d’être of the wide variety of licensing 
agreements, which cover a sub-spectrum of governance structures within the market-hierarchy 
continuum.  
                                                 
2  As pointed out by Sampson (2004) while licensors and licensees remain independent and keep strong market 
incentives, they are mutually committed to the medium or long run.  
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    The literature on licensing is undeniably rather abundant. Surprisingly, albeit this abundant 
literature, very limited attention has been dedicated to the role played by third parties in licensing. 
Indeed, although licensing agreements are essentially dyadic exchanges, licensors and licensees 
frequently decide to resort to services developed by third parties in order to ease and support their 
licensing relationships. This support can be required at one or more contractual level(s); namely 
the identification of a licensing partner, the negotiation and writing of the licensing contract, the 
monitoring of the licensing relationship, and the enforcement of the licensing contractual terms. 
As examples of third parties, we can mention technology brokers, auditing firms, mediators and 
arbitrators, chambers of commerce, sectoral federations, collective research centers, technology 
transfer offices, etc. 
    We can, therefore, easily observe in practice that the choice for a specific mode of governance 
structure (unilateral contractual agreement, bilateral contractual agreement, equity joint venture, 
subsidiary, etc.) is not the only way to deal with the level of transaction costs. Whilst 
collaborating, firms may decide to resort to services developed by third parties in order to ease 
their inter-firm relationships and, therefore, to mitigate the transaction costs.  
    The paper proceeds as follows. First, a typology of support services developed by third parties 
is proposed. Six categories of support services are considered: (1) assistance for the identification 
and selection of a licensing partner, (2) legal assistance for the negotiation of the licensing 
contract, (3) technical assistance for the implementation of the knowledge, once transferred to the 
licensee, (4) alternative dispute resolution method, (5) formal and/or informal regulation and 
collective sanctions, and (6) external control of the licensing partner’s performance. Second, in 
line with the TC arguments, I develop propositions regarding the incentives for licensing partners 
– licensor and licensee respectively – to resort to support services developed by third parties. I 
argue that this resort is contingent to the levels of asset specificity and uncertainty, which are 
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considered in the existing TC literature as the core attributes of the transaction and the primary 
determinants of cost efficiency of a governance choice (Williamson, 1979, 1985, 1991, 1996).  
  
TYPOLOGY OF SUPPORT SERVICES PROVIDED BY THIRD PARTIES 
 
When conducting a series of exploratory interviews with R&D managers and heads of legal 
department in several Belgian firms involved in licensing practices, it appeared that licensor and 
licensee commonly resort to services provided by third parties at one or multiple contractual 
level(s) – either the identification of potential licensing partners, the negotiation of the licensing 
contract, the monitoring of the licensing relationships or the enforcement of the licensing terms – 
in order to ease their contractual relationship. It seems therefore clear that considering licensor 
and licensee as the only players in the licensing strategic game does not relate the reality.   
    In this section, instead of providing a typology of third parties, a typology of support services 
developed by third parties is proposed. The reason motivating this choice is that two third parties 
may be similarly labeled – such as sectoral federation – but provide distinct support services. 
Indeed, sectoral federations provide very diverse sets of services according to the sector and the 
country they cover. As my purpose is to understand the factors motivating the resort to third 
parties to ease inter-firm relationships, it is essential to focus on the support services that they 
offer.  Here, I focus on 6 categories of support services.     
 
Assistance for the identification and selection of a licensing partner: Some third parties like 
technology brokers or technology transfer offices collect and disseminate information about 
players’ resources, capabilities and needs. They enable, therefore, firms to gather superior 
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information on each other (Gulati, 1995; Gulati et al., 2000), to identify potential partners, and to 
learn about their resources and capabilities.   
    Some third parties can even collect and convey information about players’ reputation and 
publicize defaults under the rules (Hadfield, 2000). They can serve as repositories of information 
about players’ reputation regarding, for instance, the debts unpaid or the low-quality goods 
delivered.  
 
Legal assistance for the negotiation of the licensing contract: Some third parties enable firms 
to benefit from their own experience regarding the negotiation and writing of agreements or just 
from their licensing contract templates or convention templates. These templates and assistance 
can be provided, for instance, by the legal department of several sectoral federations or by 
thematic professional associations3.   
 
Technical assistance for the implementation of the knowledge, once transferred to the 
licensee: Third parties, such as collective research centers, may put at the firms’ disposal their 
specialist facilities and/or may perform activities such as diagnostics, testing, prototyping, and 
training dedicated to facilitating the inter-firm knowledge exchange and/or the research 
collaboration (Howells, 2006).  
 
Alternative dispute resolution method: Some third parties may play a role of mediator or 
arbitrator. When opting for arbitration, parties voluntary agree to refer their dispute to an 
impartial third person and agree, in advance, to be bound by the decision of that person (Bonn, 
                                                 
3 In the specific case of the licensing agreement, we can mention for instance the Licensing Executives Society 
International.  
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1972). These mechanisms enjoy sources of efficiencies over the public courts (Richman, 2004; 
McMillan and Woodruff, 2000; Hadfield, 2000) and that is particularly true in the case of 
innovation given its technical complexity. Indeed, first, arbitrators are market participants more 
expert and specialized than public courts and are chosen4 on the basis of their expertise regarding 
the subject matter in dispute. Second, specialized rules are tailored to the idiosyncratic needs and 
transactional challenges of firms that belong for example to the same industry or the same 
technological domain. The principles guiding the dispute resolution process rest on custom rather 
than on law (Bonn, 1972). Third, specialized procedures are used to act more swiftly, at lower 
costs, and with more nuances than public courts. Indeed, they permit “greater flexibility in 
decision making and they are considered to be more private, economic, rapid, certain, and 
conducive to business relationships” (Bonn, 1972). Fourth, arbitrator can consider information 
that could not be introduced in public court5. 
 
Formal and/or informal regulation and collective sanctions: Firms may refer to and benefit 
from formal and/or informal regulation6 framework provided by third parties. Indeed, first, third 
parties may offer formal regulation by specifying and dictating “roles, role relationship, 
conventions” (Jones et al., 1997), and setting standards, norms, and guidelines which formally 
drive the inter-firm collaboration. Second, third parties may offer informal regulation by 
diffusing values and fostering a culture (Jones, 1996; Jones et al., 1997), which contribute to 
easing and enhancing the inter-firm relationships. This can be allowed through socialization 
                                                 
4 “the parties participate actively in the selection of the arbitrator” (Bonn, 1972).  
5 “Such as impressionistic evidence about business trends or judgments about the quality of items sold. They can 
base their decisions on a firm’s behavior over time, on probabilistic patterns that would not be admissible evidence 
in court. ” (McMillan and Woodruff, 2000) 
6 Informal control is performed when a culture (i.e., set of norms, values, and practices) is fostered and diffused by a 
third party and when minority that does not conform to the culture is visible (Oliver, 1991).  
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meetings organized, for instance, by professional or scientific associations. This socialization 
leads to a convergence of expectations, an idiosyncratic language, and tacitly understood rules 
(Camerer and Vepsalainen, 1988).  
    Moreover, formal and/or informal regulation may lead to formal and/or informal collective 
sanction(s). As defined by Jones et al. (1997), “collective sanctions involve group members 
punishing other members who violate group norms, values, or goals and range from gossip and 
rumors to ostracism (exclusion from the network for short periods or indefinitely) and sabotage”.  
 
External control of the licensing partner’s performance: A formal and external control of 
partners’ performance can be allowed by third parties such as accreditation agencies or auditing 
firms. These third parties inspect, control and certify the parties’ activities - and notably the 
respect of the contractual terms -   via pre-defined mechanisms and rules.  
 
 
RESORT TO THIRD PARTIES WITHIN THE LICENSING FRAMEWORK:  
THEORY AND PROPOSITIONS  
 
In line with the TC arguments, I develop propositions regarding the incentives for licensing 
partners to resort to services developed by third parties. I argue that this resort is contingent to the 
levels of asset specificity and uncertainty, considered in the existing TC literature as the core 
attributes of the transaction and the primary determinants of cost efficiency of a governance 
choice (Williamson, 1979,1985,1991,1996). Transaction Costs result from the direct costs of 
managing relationships and the possible opportunity costs of making inferior governance 
decisions (Williamson, 1991; Malone, 1987; Masten, Meehan, and Snyder, 1991). In this section, 
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we consider the factors determining the level of asset specifity and uncertainty respectively at the 
licensor’s and licensee’s level.  
 
Asset specificity  
Williamson (1991) defines the asset specificity of a transaction as the degree to which the assets 
used in support of the transaction can be redeployed to “alternative uses and by alternative users 
without sacrifice of productive value”. Six main types of asset specificity can be distinguished 
(Williamson, 1991): site specificity, physical asset specificity, human asset specificity, brand 
name capital, dedicated assets, and temporal specificity. According to the TC literature, in the 
presence of opportunism, the asset specificity poses a safeguarding problem. Without appropriate 
safeguards, there are risks of expropriation (ex post) or productive losses resulting from the 
failure to invest in specialized assets (ex ante). 
    At the licensor’s level, a key determinant of asset specificity is the tacitness of the know-how 
transferred to the licensee. Indeed, licensing may require to transfer not only the permission to 
use the knowledge covered by the patents but also tacit know-how necessary to implement this 
knowledge. The required tacit know-how may be spread across multiple employees and made up 
of many tacit elements (Chi and Roehl, 1997). Its transfer has in most cases to be achieved 
through training of personnel, trips by the licensor’s engineers or other technical services (Teece, 
1977; Contractor, 1981; Arora, 1996). Transferring tacit know-how to the licensee presents 
significant risks for the licensor. As soon as the transferred knowledge is tacit, it is not codifiable, 
it cannot be protected by property rights (Arora et al., 1999) and so, once transferred, the licensor 
risks the escape of its knowledge from proprietary control.  
    At the licensee’s level, the asset specificity is determined by the investment the licensee 
performs in assets dedicated to a specific licensing agreement. In order to implement the licensed 
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knowledge, licensee may have to make substantial investments in physical, human and temporal 
specificity such as plant, equipment, marketing commitment, and dedicated personnel. In case 
these assets are characterized by high relationship-specificity, they represent sunk costs that have 
little value for the licensee outside of the particular exchange relationship.  
    Both at the licensor’s and licensee’s level, in the presence of high asset specificity, 
opportunism by the licensing partner has to be discouraged and/or costs of crafting appropriate 
safeguards have to be incurred. I argue that licensing partners will tend to resort to support 
services developed by third parties in order to deal with high asset specificity.  
 
HYP1: the greater the level of tacitness of the knowledge transferred by the 
licensor, the more likely the licensor will resort to third parties 
 
HYP2: the greater the level of the licensee’s investment in assets dedicated to 
the licensed knowledge, the more likely the licensee will resort to third parties  
 
    Discouraging the opportunism can be eased when licensor and licensee belong to a same group 
set up by a third party and when this third party is able to apply collective sanctions within the 
group. Collective sanctions can take various forms going from penalties, substantial deterioration 
of reputation to the exclusion from the group. In that case, opportunism is more costly as it 
damages not only the specific agreement in which one behave opportunistically, but also the 
other current and potential agreements with current and future members of the group (Blumberg, 
2001). Whether formal sanctions like the exclusion of a group’s membership or informal 
sanctions as a deterioration of reputation, collective sanctions mechanisms decrease the need for 
safeguards, discourage the opportunism since “they define and reinforce the parameters of 
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acceptable behavior by demonstrating the consequence of violating norms and values” (Jones et 
al., 1997), and so reduce the transaction costs associated with asset specificity.  
 
HYP1a: the greater the level of tacitness of the knowledge transferred by the 
licensor, the more likely the licensor will resort to third parties for ‘formal 
and/or informal regulation and collective sanctions’ 
 
HYP2a: the greater the level of licensee’s investment in assets dedicated to 
the licensed knowledge, the more likely the licensee will resort to third parties 
for ‘formal and/or informal regulation and collective sanctions’ 
 
    Besides making the opportunism more costly; crafting appropriate safeguards is also important 
to deal with the high level of asset specifity. In this line, resorting to third parties providing 
alternative dispute resolution such as arbitrators may correspond to a safeguard against 
vulnerabilities caused by asset specificity. As mentioned before, alternative dispute resolution 
methods enjoy sources of efficiencies over the public court (Richman, 2004; McMillan and 
Woodruff, 2000; Hadfield, 2000).  
 
HYP1b: the greater the level of tacitness of the knowledge transferred by the 
licensor, the more likely the licensor will resort to third parties for 
‘alternative dispute resolution method’  
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HYP2b: the greater the level of licensee’s investment in assets dedicated to 
the licensed knowledge, the more likely the licensee will resort to third parties 
for ‘alternative dispute resolution method’  
 
Environmental uncertainty 
Williamson (1991) considers three types of uncertainty. The first two ones - primary and 
secondary uncertainties - were developed by Koopmans (1957). The primary uncertainty is of 
state-contingent kind and reflects a lack of knowledge about states of nature, such as the 
uncertainty regarding natural events. The secondary uncertainty reflects a lack of knowledge 
about the actions of other economic actors and arises “from lack of communication, that is from 
one decision maker having no way of finding out the concurrent decisions and plans made by 
others” (Williamson, 1991). Williamson (1985) describes both primary and secondary 
uncertainties as ‘innocent’ and ‘non strategic’ forms of uncertainty and highlights the existence of 
a third type of uncertainty, which is attributable to opportunism and will be referred to as 
behavioral uncertainty. This third type of uncertainty corresponds to the deliberate nondisclosure 
of information or the strategic misrepresentation of information by economic agents. 
    Whatever the type of uncertainty, it will only have a significant influence if the transaction is 
specific and supported by idiosyncratic investments. It is, therefore, conditional to the level of 
asset specificity. Indeed, whatever the level of uncertainty, in the presence of low asset specificity 
and standardized transactions, the continuity has little value, adaptative capabilities are not 
crucial, and arrangement can easily be adopted by both parties if necessary (Williamson, 1985).  
    As uncertainty consists of a number of distinct constructs (Sutcliffe and Zaheer, 1998; Leiblein 
and Miller, 2003; David and Han, 2004; Parmigiani, 2007), a better understanding of how each 
type of uncertainty affects the resort to services developed by third parties can be reached by 
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exploring separate hypotheses for each; namely the environmental uncertainty and the behavioral 
uncertainty.  
    The environmental uncertainty can originate from suppliers, customers, competitors, 
regulatory agencies, unions, or financial markets (Miles and Snow, 1978). It “reflects the 
uncertainty arising from exogenous sources such as natural events, from changes in preferences, 
as well as from regulatory changes, such as those involving standards or tariffs” (Stucliffe and 
Zaheer, 1998).  According to the TC literature, the environmental uncertainty combined with 
bounded rationality causes an adaptation problem. This refers to the difficulties with modifying 
agreements in reaction to the “unanticipated changes in circumstances surrounding an 
exchange” (Noordewier, John, and Nevin, 1990). The direct costs resulting from adaptation 
problem are costs of communicating new information, renegotiating agreements, or coordinating 
activities to reflect new circumstances. The failure to adapt represents the opportunity cost of 
maladaptation (Malone, 1987). 
    At the licensor’s level, the level of inefficacy of the Intellectual Property (IP) rights system in 
the licensee’s country is a strong determinant of environmental uncertainty. In the licensing 
context, the ‘quality’ of the institutional environment depends widely on the IP rights regime 
(Williamson, 1991; Oxley, 1999; La Porta et al., 1999) whose ‘strength’ and ‘completeness’ vary 
across countries and industries (Anand and Khanna, 2000). The ‘quality’ of the institutional 
environment in terms of IP rights protection has commonly been assessed on the basis of the 
levels of IP rights measurement and enforcement achieved by public institutions (e.g., Ginarte 
and Park, 1997; Ostergard, 2000). The efficacy of the IP rights system is critical for the licensor 
as weak and unpredictable IP protection may always make possible for the licensee to invent 
around the knowledge transferred and to renege on the terms of the agreement (Anand and 
Khanna, 2000; Teece, 1988).  
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    At the licensee’s level, the demand volatility and technological uncertainty are significant 
dimensions to consider. Indeed, the technology may not work properly in the new location, the 
demand for the product that embodies it may change, newer technologies may displace it (Caves 
et al., 1983). This uncertainty is even more present when technology is licensed abroad since 
information about foreign firms and markets, necessary to assess the probable return to a 
technology transaction, is costly to secure. The potential returns to the technology licensed 
abroad are accordingly uncertain (Caves et al., 1983).  
    Both at the licensor’s and licensee’s level, in the presence of significant environmental 
uncertainty, adaptation is unavoidable and so communication of new information, renegotiation 
of agreements, and coordination activities have to be favored and eased. I argue that licensing 
partners will tend to resort to support services developed by third parties in order to deal with 
significant environmental uncertainty. 
 
HYP3: the greater the inefficacy of the IP rights system in the licensee’s 
country, the more likely the licensor will resort to third parties 
 
HYP4: the greater the demand volatility and technological uncertainty, the 
more likely the licensee will resort to third parties 
 
    In the presence of potential adaptation problems, the coordination challenges are magnified, 
the modification of agreements is often required and, therefore, the resort to third parties able to 
provide legal assistance and make licensing partners benefit from their own experience in terms 
of negotiation is more likely.  
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HYP3a: the greater the inefficacy of the IP rights system of the licensee’s country, 
the more likely the licensor will resort to third parties for ‘legal assistance’  
 
HYP4a: the greater the demand volatility and technological uncertainty, the more 
likely the licensee will resort to third parties for ‘legal assistance’  
 
    When considering more specifically the technological uncertainty arising from changes in 
technology framework due to inventions and discoveries (Stucliffe and Zaheer, 1998), the 
support from third parties providing technical expertise via diagnostics, testing, prototyping, and 
training may significantly contribute to easing the adaptation required at this level. These third 
parties are in most cases aware of the latest technological evolutions and their applicability.   
 
HYP4b: the greater the demand volatility and technological uncertainty, the more 
likely the licensee will resort to third parties for ‘technical assistance’ 
 
    Finally, adaptation problem can more easily be handled if licensing partners refer to formal 
and/or informal regulation provided by third parties. Indeed, as exposed before, referring to third 
parties’ regulation may involve the respect for “roles, role relationship, conventions” (Jones et 
al., 1997) specified and dictated by themselves. Moreover, socialization events and activities can 
be organized by third parties and help diffuse values and a culture. Having this ability, third 
parties can respond to unanticipated change by designing collective support services to ease and 
frame the necessary adaptation process.  
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HYP3b: the greater inefficacy of the IP rights system of the licensee’s country, the 
more likely the licensor will resort to third parties for ‘formal and/or informal 
regulation’ 
 
HYP4c: the greater the demand volatility and technological uncertainty, the more 
likely the licensee will resort to third parties for ‘formal and/or informal regulation’ 
 
Behavioral uncertainty  
This third type of uncertainty corresponds to the deliberate nondisclosure of information or the 
strategic misrepresentation of information by economic agents. According to the TC literature, 
the behavioral uncertainty causes performance evaluation problem and the relevant opportunity 
costs are associated with losses resulting from establishing relationships with parties that lack 
needed skills or motivations.  
    At the licensor’s level, the behavioral uncertainty is determined by the difficulty in measuring 
the performance of the licensee and in detecting its potential strategic misbehavior. Once 
transferred, it is hardly possible for the patentee-licensor to withdraw the knowledge from the 
licensee’s own stock of knowledge. The licensee’s strategic misbehavior is therefore particularly 
damaging; the licensee can either use the knowledge transferred without paying any 
compensation to the inventor, thereby depriving him of anticipated revenue, or worse, can use 
this knowledge to actually harm the licensor. For instance, the inventor’s insights may form the 
basis for innovations that surpass the licensor’s own technical solutions. In such a context, it is 
critical for the licensor to detect easily the potential infringement of patents and the cheating 
about payment, secret, or other contractual commitments by the licensee.  
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    At the licensee’s level, the required additional assistance in management, marketing and 
engineering from the licensor determines the importance of behavioral uncertainty for the 
licensee. When licensing involves more than just the permission to use the knowledge covered by 
the patent and requires a transfer of heuristics, rules of thumb, and other “tricks of the trade” for 
successful utilization (Arora, 1996), the quality and the extent of these additional transfers must 
be delivered by the licensor as expected by the licensee. However, while additional assistance 
may be necessary to implement the licensed knowledge, licensor may be tempted to skim on its 
quality or extent due to its costs often prohibitive. Routines and rules of thumb - technical 
services (Teece, 1977; Contractor, 1981) - may result from a long period of technological 
development by the licensor, often through trial and error type search processes (Sahal, 1981;see 
also Nelson, 1990 and Pavitt, 1987). The quality or the extent of the additional assistance 
(services) in engineering but also in management and marketing may vary according to the 
efforts made by the licensor (Arora, 1996). 
    Both at the licensor’s and licensee’s level, in the presence of high behavioral uncertainty, the 
ex ante (prior to the signature of the licensing agreement) and ex post (throughout the contractual 
duration) partner’s performance assessments are critical. I argue that licensing partners will tend 
to resort to services developed by third parties in order to deal with the high behavioral 
uncertainty.  
 
HYP5: the greater the difficulty in detecting the licensee’s strategic 
misbehavior, the more likely the licensor will resort to third parties 
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HYP6: the greater the required additional assistance in management, 
marketing and engineering from the licensor, the more likely the licensee will 
resort to third parties 
 
    As pointed out by Gulati and Gargiulo (1999), “imperfect information about potential partners 
raises search costs and the risk of exposure to opportunistic behavior (Gulati, 1995; Gulati and 
Singh, 1999)”. The ability to properly evaluate potential partners’ ex ante performance in terms 
of resources, capabilities, and reliability enables to identify appropriate and reliable licensing 
partners a priori, and so to reduce the risks for misinformation with the intention of profiting at 
its expense. However, this evaluation can give rise to significant direct screening and selection 
costs (Bergen, Dutta, and Walker, 1992). Resorting to repository of information about player’s 
resources, capabilities and needs helps gather superior information on each other (Gulati, 1995; 
Gulati, Nohria, and Zaheer, 2000), identify potential partners, and learn about their resources and 
capabilities.    
    Moreover, some third parties provide information about players’ reputation as well. This type 
of information is mostly conveyed informally by third parties that have a higher ability to collect 
it and to publicize defaults under the rules.  This allows to avoid allying with recurrent 
opportunistic partners.  
 
HYP5a: the greater the difficulty in detecting the licensee’s strategic misbehavior, 
the more likely the licensor will resort to third parties for ‘assistance in the 
identification and selection of a licensing partner’ 
 
 17
HYP6a: the greater the required additional assistance in management, marketing, 
and engineering from the licensor, the more likely the licensee will resort to third 
parties for ‘assistance in the identification and selection of a licensing partner’ 
 
    The partners’ ex post performance evaluation is also critical to avoid the deliberate 
nondisclosure of information or the strategic misrepresentation of information by the licensing 
partner. However, it can be impeded by the significant direct measurement costs - either to 
measure the outputs or to measure the behaviors (Eisenhardt, 1985) - that this evaluation may 
induce. It will be even “greater for more complex goods, especially those that involve multiple 
components and technologies, since complexity increases the difficulty in evaluating quality 
through inspection prior to use (Coles and Hesterly, 1998; Bensaou and Anderson, 1999; Novak 
and Eppinger, 2001) ” (Parmigiani, 2007). The direct measurement costs (Eisenhardt, 1985) of 
outputs and/or behaviors of other parties may be mitigated by resorting to ‘external control 
providers’. These third parties can perform activities such as inspection of the parties’ activities 
and their certification.       
 
HYP5b: the greater the difficulty in detecting the licensee’s strategic misbehavior, 
the more likely the licensor will resort to third parties for ‘external control’ 
 
HYP6b: the greater the required additional assistance in management, marketing, 
and engineering from the licensor, the more likely the licensee will resort to third 
parties for ‘external control’ 
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  ---------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
---------------------------- 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
My purpose was to shed light on the role played by third parties in the licensor-licensee 
relationship. Indeed, while the studies anchored in the Transaction Costs tradition and devoted to 
licensing are rather abundant, most of them consider licensing exclusively as a bilateral game. 
However, we can easily observe in practice that services developed by third parties are frequently 
solicited at one or multiple contractual level(s) by licensing partners.  
    In this context, I argue that opting for a more hierarchical form of governance structure is not 
the only way to deal with the level of transaction costs. In the presence of high transaction costs 
stemming from significant uncertainty and high asset specificity, licensing partners can decide to 
resort to services developed by third parties in order to ease their relationships and so mitigate the 
level of transaction costs. 
    In order to strengthen this vision about the way licensors and licensees manage their 
relationships, further research is undeniably required. Empirical research is essential to justify the 
use of the Transaction Costs arguments to explain the recourse to third parties in licensing 
relationships.  
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 Table1: Support services developed by third parties and governance problems 
 
Exchange 
characteristics 
 
Licensor/Licensee Governance 
problems 
Support Services 
provided by  
Third parties 
 
Reduction of 
TC 
 
Needs for 
reduction of 
opportunism 
‘formal and/or 
informal regulation 
and collective 
sanctions’  
ex post 
enforcement cost 
Asset 
specificity  
 
Licensor: tacit know-
how transferred 
 
Licensee: investment 
performed in assets 
dedicated to the 
licensed knowledge   
Needs for 
appropriate 
safeguards  
‘alternative dispute 
resolution method’  
ex post 
enforcement cost 
‘legal assistance for 
the negotiation of the 
licensing contract’ 
ex ante 
contractual cost 
 
‘technical assistance 
for the 
implementation of 
the knowledge’  
ex post 
monitoring cost 
 
 
Environmental 
uncertainty 
Licensor: inefficacy 
of the IP rights 
system in the 
licensee’s country 
 
Licensee: demand 
volatility and 
technological 
uncertainty 
Needs for 
adaptation 
‘formal and/or 
informal regulation’  
ex post 
monitoring cost  
Needs for party’s 
ex ante 
performance 
assessment 
‘assistance in the 
identification and 
selection of a 
licensing partner’  
ex ante search 
cost  
Behavioral 
uncertainty 
 
Licensor: difficulty to 
detect licensee’s 
strategic misbehavior 
 
Licensee: required 
additional assistance 
in management, 
marketing, and 
engineering  
Needs for party’s 
ex post 
performance 
assessment 
‘external control’   ex post 
monitoring cost 
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